Issues of race and class have long been at the center of discourses involving the American public education system. Although contemporary discourse regarding issues of race and power in American schools may be less overt in racist ideology than in previous decades, the impact of coded racist discourse can be equally powerful and dangerous. A need exists to identify racist and classist discourse in educational contexts so that the ideologies and practices these discourses reflect can be challenged. This paper uses (...) critical discourse analysis and Critical Race Theory to examine how the discourses of race, class, and power are enacted within a discussion of educational programing and child well-being in a predominantly White, upper-middle class suburban public school. (shrink)

The Y chromosomes of most Drosophila species are necessary for male fertility but they are not involved in sex determination. They have many puzzling properties that resemble the effects caused by B chromosomes. Classical genetic and molecular studies reveal substantial affinities between Y and B chromosomes and suggest that the Y chromosomes of Drosophila are not degenerated homologues of the X chromosomes, but rather that their Y chromosomes evolved as specialized supernumeraries similar to classical B chromosomes.

Cahier 1 : « Merleau-Ponty. Philosophie et non-philosophie ».E. de Saint-Aubert, La « promiscuité ». Merleau-Ponty à la recherche d’une psychanalyse ontologique ; P. Maniglier, De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss : cinquante ans après. Pour une ontologie Maori ; E. Bimbenet, Sens pratique et pratiques réflexives. Quelques développements sociologiques de l’ontologie..

Wiplinger, F. Metaphysik, Logik, Sprachkritik.--Mück, O. Wahrheit und Verifikation.--Strasser, S. Zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit.--Rivera de Ventosa, E. Dialektik und Dialog.--Schöndorfer, U. Ganzheitliche Erkenntnistheorie.--Lotz, J. B. Denken als Vollzug im Ganzen.--Benedikt, M. Orientierung und Architektonik.--Schaff, A. Ein Marxist liest die Integrale Logik.--Ricoeur, P. Wissenschaft und Ideologie.--Kohlenberger, H. Geschichtsprozess als Integration.--Huber, G. Zur Grundproblematik der philosophischen Anthropologie.--Wisser, R. Schöpfung und Schöpfertum in der Philosophie.--Verosta, S. Zum Verhältnis von Ordnung und Macht.--Schneider, H. Politische Ethik in der gegenwärtigen Normenkrise.

In a stable theory, a stationary type $q \in S\left$ internal to a family of partial types ${\cal P}$ over A gives rise to a type-definable group, called its binding group. This group is isomorphic to the group $Aut\left$ of permutations of the set of realizations of q, induced by automorphisms of the monster model, fixing ${\cal P}\,\mathop \cup \nolimits \,A$ pointwise. In this article, we investigate families of internal types varying uniformly, what we will call relative internality. We prove (...) that the binding groups also vary uniformly, and are the isotropy groups of a natural type-definable groupoid. We then investigate how properties of this groupoid are related to properties of the type. In particular, we obtain internality criteria for certain 2-analysable types, and a sufficient condition for a type to preserve internality. (shrink)

According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...) joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true. (shrink)

Let us agree, to begin with, that we are not shown [in Last Judgment], as Life Magazine long ago phrased it, a Saint Bartholomew who "holds his own mortal skin, in which Michelangelo whimsically painted a distorted portrait of himself.”1 The face was sloughed with the rest of the skin and goes with it. What we see is a Saint Bartholomew with another's integument in his hand. We next consider an aspect of the self-portrait which even La Cava left out (...) of account - its relative siting. This has to matter since the portrait lies in the path of Christ's imminent action. More than that, it lies on a diagonal that traverses the fresco like a heraldic bend chief to base - from left top to right bottom. The twofold competence thus assumed by the self-portrait - in its concrete location and in the range of its influence - is something to marvel at. A hangdog face flops to one side, helpless and limp. But the tilt of its axis projected upward across the field strikes the apex of the left-hand lunette, the uppermost point of the fresco. And if, departing once again from the skin's facial axis, we project its course netherward, we discover the line produced to aim straight at the fresco's lower right corner. Such results do not come by chance. To put it literally, letting metaphor fall where it may: it is the extension of the self's axis that strings the continuum of heaven and hell. · 1. Life Magazine, 6 December 1949, p. 45. So also Redig de Campos speaks of the lifeless Apostle's own skin, "dove il Buonarroti ha nascoto un singolare autoritratto..in caricatura tragica della sua 'infinita miseria'" . Tolnay sees the matter correctly: "It is the artist's empty skin which the saint holds in his hand" Leo Steinberg is Benjamin Franklin Professor and University Professor of the History of Art at the University of Pennsylvania. His publications include Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art, Michelangelo's Last Paintings, Borromini's San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, as well as studies of Leonardo, Pontormo, Velazquez, and Picasso. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Robert Leo CRITICISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN SHELLEY'S A DEFENCE OF POETRY IN his "Ode to Liberty" Shelley locates by encircling and enfolding metaphors a mythic Hellenic moment, one in which verse was yet "speechless" and philosophy still burdened with "lidless eyes." Greece— always for Shelley either the displaced Garden of prethematic unity or the mythic dream of integrated civic and aesthetic life—is about to inaugurate Athens and the (...) "wrinkled image" of historical consciousness.1 Poetry, thinking, and the tilling of an earth "to human use" are implicitly related and foreseen as destiny: from their enchanted caves Prophetic echoes flung dim melody. On the unapprehensive wild The vine, the corn, the olive mild, Grew savage yet, to human use unreconciled; And, like unfolded flowers beneath the sea, Like the man's dark thought in the infant's brain, Like aught that is which wraps what is to be, Art's deathless dreams lay veiled by many a vein Of Parian stone; and, yet a speechless child, Verse murmured, and Philosophy did strain Her lidless eyes for thee... (11. 49-60). Shelley could be describing the reading or speaking of a text, for poetic experience is an originating moment which unfolds our reflections and anticipations. Poetry elides speechlessness and the empty gaze. Its goings are all returnings, its experience is always inventive before meanings codify and resolve: "Every original language near to its source," we find in the Defence (p. 279), "is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem; the copiousness of lexicography and the distinctions of grammar are the works of a later age and are merely the catalogue and the form of the creations of poetry." What was dark to experience is now illumined, 46 John Robert Leo47 as different regions in experience are uncovered or redistributed by language across our shifting horizons. Thus this bringing-foward-intoclarity, this moving of the previously inexpressed into articulation, is the pattern not only behind Shelley's view ofGreece producing a "sun-fire garlanded" Athens (1. 68), but also the more pervasive design describing other regarded experience. James Edie puts it this way: "We... can learn to make distinctions in our experience by attending to differences of meaning which are normally below the level of our own cultural threshold. By attending to a given region of experience, we can lower the differential thresholds already sedimented in our language almost indefinitely and make what was implicit in our experience more and more explicit."2 Edie's comments may be taken as responses to questions emerging from modernist readings of Shelley and other visionary poets—Blake, Hart Crane, or Charles Olson are instances—who sense the poetic project as a criticism of consciousness, within the lived body, as it struggles to make a world. How do language and the imagination consort in the critical regeneration of our lives? In what sorts of ways is renascence the uncovering and unfolding of an indefinite wholeness by the unlayering of fixed habits and attitudes? How does Shelley's Defence of Poetry, both a text on aesthetics and a reading of the world, suggest their alignment? What methods from critical discourse make Shelley's poetics present to our experience and thought? The adjustment of these issues is the task of the remainder of my article. First I examine Shelley's organization of consciousness into "reason" and "imagination" and trace the meanings of these functions in their immediate social context. A brief dispute with the reductive idealism of Platonic tradition allows for my third procedure, which is a phenomenological description of the imaginative field according to Husserl. Finally, I try to explicate Shelley's understanding of imaginative "decentering" within our experience. I Poetry and prose are saturated with references to phenomena. Texts refer to interior and exterior events (memory, rain), which are objects ofandfor consciousness. Shelley grasps this co-givenness of consciousness and world, their correlativity, as a condition revealed and strengthened by metaphor, which itself arrests us as "that of which we are speaking through words."3 But if it is the nature of language to be both perceptual and yet transcendental, both present and absent, it still exists as the imagination's voice in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Wrestling with GodLeo D. LefebureWrestling with God. By Paul O. Ingram. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2006. 116 + xii pp.Paul Ingram of Pacific Lutheran University is a long-time veteran of Buddhist-Christian dialogue and a generous contributor to the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies. His earlier book, Wrestling with the Ox, took the famous Zen ox herding pictures as an entry point for reflecting on the transformation of identity that (...) can take place in Buddhist-Christian relations. The present book opens with the image of Jacob wrestling with God in Genesis 32 as a launching point for exploring religious diversity in a world ever more shaped by natural science. Ingram's thesis is that "Christianity is now in a process of decay and that dialogue with the world's religions—especially Buddhism—and Christian dialogue with the natural sciences are the two most important intellectual foci for thinking Christians" (p. x).Relating his position to that of John Hick while questioning Hick's Kantian epistemology, Ingram proposes a pluralistic evaluation of the world's religious traditions—or at least some forms of them. Ingram seeks to be deeply rooted in the Christian tradition while being open to the legitimate variety of other religions. Nonetheless, Ingram has rather harsh words to say about "legalists and fundamentalists" without ever offering a precise definition of who is included in these terms. He describes fundamentalists in all religious traditions as "trapped in the conventional categories of their ideologies" (p. 21), but what counts as "conventional categories" or as "ideologies" is never fully clarified.Ingram rejects any tradition's claim to have "the final or the exclusive or the inclusive Word about God" because this would be a form of idolatry, which Muslims call shirk (p. 19). Ingram's position would appear to condemn a very wide spectrum, including traditional Christians and Muslims who believe that their respective scriptures express God's final revelation. Such a grouping would appear to be far broader than those conventionally labeled "fundamentalist." For example, Vatican II's Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei Verbum) expresses the traditional Catholic belief that Jesus Christ is the center of revelation and no further public revelation is to be expected before his Second Coming; the constitution also accepts historical criticism of the Bible and thus does not fit the usual model of "fundamentalism." Because "fundamentalist" is frequently not a contemporary form of self-designation, it would be helpful to have more specific guidance on how Ingram wishes to apply the term, especially to contexts that are not Christian. If all those who firmly hold traditional doctrinal views are included under this umbrella, Ingram's pluralistic thesis presents itself as firmly rejecting a considerable range of the world's religious traditions.Citing Alfred North Whitehead and contemporary physics, Ingram finds plurality and interdependence to be at the heart of all forms of existence, "from sub-atomic [End Page 201] particles to religious traditions to God" (p. 20). This is a clear rejection of the Muslim doctrine of tawhid, the radical oneness of God, which for Muslims excludes any notion of Trinity or plurality or interdependence in God. Even though Ingram clearly intends to include Islam among the community of acceptable religions, central Muslim beliefs in the oneness of God and the finality of the Qur'an appear to be unacceptable to his position.If we ask about the criteria for distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable forms of religion, much in Ingram's discussion seems to turn on intuition and emotion. He tells us that the basis for a person belonging to one religious tradition rather than another is not rational argument; rather, "It all depends on what or who 'speaks' to you" (p. 31). While admiring a wide range of religious leaders, Ingram admits, "I don't 'experience' them. They don't 'speak' to me" (p. 31). Ingram acknowledges that his difficulty with fundamentalist Christians is strongly emotional: "Whenever I listen to fundamentalist Christians describe Jesus as a kind of best buddy, I feel a little creepy" (p. 32). Ingram is distrustful of claims of reason regarding religion: "You find yourself in a state of faith, that is you 'get... (shrink)

I. La vida de Baruj Spinoza.--II. La época de Baruj Spinoza.--III. La obra de Baruj Spinoza.--IV. La influencia de Baruj Spinoza. Bibliografía (p. [323]-331).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Question of Style in Philosophy and the ArtsJeffrey R. Di LeoThe Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts, edited by Caroline van Eck, James McAllister and Renée van de Vall; xi & 245 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $49.95.The question, “Should philosophers concern themselves with questions of style?” motivates this rich collection of twelve essays on the interrelatedness of content and its formal representation in (...) both philosophical writing and the arts. Alongside issues such as aestheticized forms of philosophizing and the relationship between method and style, there are articles on Heinrich von Kleist’s Marionettentheater, the graphic works of William Hogarth, Alexis de Tocqueville’s use of metaphor and paradox, the use of ellipses in Johannes Kepler’s astronomical theories, and eclecticism in eighteenth-century English architecture.Style has been an explicit concern for historians and theorists of the arts long before it came to the fore in philosophy. The editors think philosophers can learn a lot not only about the concept of style but also about philosophical style by looking into the practices of musicians, architects, and painters and by thinking about how styles are formed, transformed, and understood in the arts. By comparing the arts and philosophy, we can move toward something lacking in contemporary discussions, namely stylistic categories specific to philosophy. Richard Wollheim’s essay, for example, offers many categories appropriate to painting that could be relevant to philosophical writing.A provocative point traced here is that until the end of the eighteenth century, “style” had little to do with the meaning of a work of art—the term merely denoted an artwork’s place in the hierarchy of art. Before 1800, there was hardly a question of choice among styles: contributions to a practice were regarded not as belonging to one style or another, but as falling within or being alien to a practice. Only in the early nineteenth century did style become a key element in the meaning of a work, when it took the place previously occupied by nature, antiquity, or absolute standards of reason. With the traditional bearers of meaning gone, one could no longer look to content for meaning, and artists turned to style to create meaningful art—style being that aspect of writing, painting, or building traditionally associated with ornament, that could be varied without changing the content. Gradually, the “variable” element in art became the prime bearer of meaning.The claim here is that an analogous transition from stylistic monism to pluralism occurred in philosophy about a century after it did in art. This shift away from the monistic geometrical and mathematical standards of philosophical reasoning established in the late sixteenth century was brought about by philosophers such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Lambert Weising suggests that, with Wittgenstein, there is a substitution of style for truth—a point which seems equally true of others, notably Nietzsche. A consequence of this new [End Page 187] pluralism is a loosening of what can be called philosophical reasoning, and an increasing receptiveness to and acceptance of a diversity of philosophical styles. Questions of style do tend to arise in connections with philosophers of the literary sort—Plato or Kierkegaard. Now philosophers have much less difficulty regarding as philosophical a work such as Pascal’s Pensées, which has traditionally been treated more as literature than as philosophy.One of the challenges of this collection is to refute the view of those who deny that the content of their philosophical writing depends at all on style. This would give support to a thesis defended by Martha Nussbaum in this journal in 1983: “No stylistic choice can be presumed to be neutral—not even the choice to write in a flat or neutral style” (p. 146). Beryl Lang, who has addressed this question in other books and articles, argues that style is relevant to all philosophical writing, even that professed to be “style-less.” Lang correctly shows that philosophers’ general disregard for expressiveness, and their belief that the proper philosophical method will lead all who follow it to the same results, has itself become a feature of philosophical writing. So “style-less” writing is a philosophical... (shrink)

Boyer suggests that laws cannot account for ownership intuitions, but there may be situations when intuitions hew to laws almost perfectly. Laws granting governments taxation powers provide an interesting case study. We report data here suggesting that people's intuitions track law very closely, and are unaffected by manipulating a P() tag input. We propose two hypotheses to explain this finding.

Leo Strauss and his alleged political influence regarding the Iraq War have in recent years been the subject of significant media attention, including stories in the _Wall Street Journal _and _New York Times._ _Time_ magazine even called him “one of the most influential men in American politics.” With _The Truth about Leo Strauss_, Michael and Catherine Zuckert challenged the many claims and speculations about this notoriously complex thinker. Now, with _Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy_, they turn their (...) attention to a searching and more comprehensive interpretation of Strauss’s thought as a whole, using the many manifestations of the “problem of political philosophy” as their touchstone. For Strauss, political philosophy presented a “problem” to which there have been a variety of solutions proposed over the course of Western history. Strauss’s work, they show, revolved around recovering—and restoring—political philosophy to its original Socratic form. Since positivism and historicism represented two intellectual currents that undermined the possibility of a Socratic political philosophy, the first part of the book is devoted to Strauss’s critique of these two positions. Then, the authors explore Strauss’s interpretation of the history of philosophy and both ancient and modern canonical political philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Locke. Strauss’s often-unconventional readings of these philosophers, they argue, pointed to solutions to the problem of political philosophy. Finally, the authors examine Strauss’s thought in the context of the twentieth century, when his chief interlocutors were Schmitt, Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. The most penetrating and capacious treatment of the political philosophy of this complex and often misunderstood thinker, from his early years to his last works, _Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy_ reveals Strauss’s writings as an attempt to show that the distinctive characteristics of ancient and modern thought derive from different modes of solving the problem of political philosophy and reveal why he considered the ancient solution both philosophically and politically superior. (shrink)

In 1997 an international conference on Aristotle and modern science took place in Thessaloniki. Aristotle’s view of nature—his criticism of the atomists, on the one hand, and modern science, on the other—seem to be widely opposed, but in recent years science has changed so much that scientists resort to certain basic notions of Aristotle’s natural philosophy to underpin their theories and make material nature more intelligible. In a first paper Hilary Putnam argues against Victor Gaston that Aristotle’s theory of cognition (...) is a “ direct realism” and not as many say a theory based on representation. Perception and thinking are in direct contact with things and their properties. In a charming comparison Bas C. van Fraassen argues that both tragedy and science are subspecies of representation. As in poetry, in science the inexplicable is kept off stage. John P. Anton is confident that the revival of Aristotle’s model of science can provide a solution to the question of the unity of the various sciences. He levels a stinging attack at Putnam’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of cognition. Lambros Couloubaritsis voices amazement that in Physics IV Aristotle says nothing about the creative capacity of time, but believes that the notion of “appropriate time” will bring this out. James R. Brown argues that the main stream of science stemming from the seventeenth century is a fusion of the Platonic and mechanic traditions, but that in recent years Aristotle has made an impressive comeback. He examines to what extent the notion of potentiality may be in agreement with and help explain certain physical facts perceived by common sense observation, although it does no justice to quantum “ bizarreness”. He sees better help in the Platonic account of formal causality. Speaking about levels of reality Basarab Nicolescu believes that the universe is self-creating, showing an open structure. A flow of information traverses the various levels of reality. The notion of potency, we are told by Ephtichios Bitsakis, exercises quite some attraction on scientists. Indeed, Aristotle is a precursor of scientific realism, but his theories are marred by many inconsistencies: the Prime Mover, final causality, and entelechy contradict his dynamic view of nature and should be abandoned. In the transformation of massive particles into nonmassive ones the actual mass becomes potential. Thomas M. Olshewsky points out that Aristotle has a differentiated notion of prime matter and rejects absolute prime matter. Jagdish Hattiangadi suggests giving up the idea of substance. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou also tackles “the always actual question” of what matter is for Aristotle. Nowadays the idea of stable particles has disappeared and we have to deal with what is potentially real. (shrink)

This carefully edited book, complete with notes, a bibliography, and indexes, contains fourteen papers selected from those read at the yearly meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. The essays are divided into three groups dealing with logic, metaphysics, and the soul. John P. Anton argues that the categories do not mean predicates but fundamental types of attribution formulated in accordance with the ontology of first substance. D. Morrison points out that they stand for classes of being in the (...) universe. The question of why Plotinus dispensed with some of the categories is the subject of C. Evangeliou's paper: Plotinus tended to reduce even quantity and quality to relations and made action and passion species of motion, whereas Aristotle never referred to motion as a category. A. Urbanas presents a valuable study of the meaning of ὅπερ. (shrink)

Many authors do not consider Book 4 of the Meteorology authentic. The main reasons to doubt its Aristotelian origin are the absence of primary matter in the explanation of the formation of the elements and, secondly, the theory of pores. It is difficult to believe that Aristotle would have replaced his classic doctrine of matter and form of the Physics by a theory which makes such contraries as hot and cold, dry and moist the principles, or even the matter, out (...) of which things come to be. Likewise the refutal of the theory of pores in the Physics and the On Generation and Corruption makes one wonder whether in Meteorology 4 he could have returned to something close to atomism, as Lewis thinks he did. These difficulties explain why the Aristotelian authorship of the treatise is questionable, although some defend it. Professor Lewis belongs to this group. He accepts Furley’s arguments in favor of its authenticity and has a more positive view of its contents than H. D. P. Lee in his introduction to the Loeb Edition of the text. Meteorology 4 is an attempt to discuss a wide range of cosmic phenomena. It contains a further development of the theory of primary matter and the four elements. The commentary by Alexander does not help us much to solve the above mentioned difficulties. Lewis’s translation is good, though. In 179.18 of the text, Lewis translates en hypostasei einai by “they are actually existent,” but it seems better to read “they are in a subject”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit by Martin HeideggerP. Christopher SmithMartin Heidegger. Being and Time. A Translation of “Sein und Zeit. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xix + 487. Paper, $18.95.A new English translation of Heidegger’s best book, Sein und Zeit has been eagerly anticipated ever since the appearance of the Macquarrie/Robinson translation in 1962.1 For anyone (...) with an ear for German would find that, in turning Heidegger’s visceral prose into wooden terminology, this first pathbreaking and very scholarly translation failed completely to render the startling and wholly untraditional diction of this work, a diction that rocked a staid and stifling academia and that in lectures preceding the book’s publication had therefore attracted students in droves, among them Leo Strauss, Hanna Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Herbert Marcuse, and Hans Jonas. At long last, a new translation, Joan Stambaugh’s, is here, but, unfortunately, it is no better in this crucial regard, and it is not as scholarly either. (Macquarrie/Robinson do provide many detailed and useful accounts of their choices of translation.) Indeed, the new translation often seems to be a mere revision of the old and falls into much of the old translation’s terminological uprooting of Heidegger’s sometimes thick but always earthy language. Here are three examples.In S we find this rendering of Heidegger’s preliminary account of the phenomenological method he will apply in “laying out” our “factual” human existence “there” “in the world” of our cooperative taking care of life’s tasks:This “a priori” of the interpretation of Da-sein is not a structure which is pieced together, but rather a structure which is primordially and constantly whole. It grants various perspectives on the factors which constitute it. These factors are to be kept constantly in view, bearing in mind the preceding whole of this structure.(S 37)In M/R this same passage is translated, somewhat more readably and accurately, as:In the interpretation of Dasein, this structure is something ‘a priori’; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole. If affords us, however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it. The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.(M/R 65) [End Page 148]We note, first, how many of the M/R translations are taken over by S: “not a structure... pieced together,” which mistranslates “keine zusammengestückte Bestimmtheit” (SZ 41) or “not a determination arrived at bit by bit,” and “[structure]... primordial(ly) and constant(ly) (a) whole” for “eine ursprünglich und ständig ganze Struktur,” in which the English “primordial” turns the rather ordinary “ursprünglich” or “originally” into a technical term. Indeed, this phrase might best be rendered in more usual English along the lines of “This structure, assumed a priori... is originally, and continues to be, a whole.” For the point, lost in S but preserved in M/R with their “however,” is precisely that even though Dasein has been determined ahead of time to have the basic structure of a whole, we can still elucidate different sides of it phenomenologically by “throwing them into relief” (compare Heideger’s “phänomenal abzuheben”). In S, Heidegger’s pivotal “phänomenal” is lost altogether.Here, next, is how S renders Heidegger’s account of the call of conscience, which calls us back from our having lost ourselves in pressed busyness and vain chattering, at just that moment when these lose all their significance for us and go dead:The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces Da-sein thus summoned and called upon to the reticence of itself.(S 252–53).And here is the M/R translation:The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Christ Who Meets Us in the Sacraments:The Influence of St. Ambrose on the tertia pars of St. Thomas's Summa theologiaeDamian Day O.P.IntroductionThe recent increased interest in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church has produced a number of excellent studies of the Angelic Doctor's understanding of the authority of the Fathers and his use of them.1 In this article, I hope to contribute to the ongoing (...) study of Aquinas and the Fathers by examining how Thomas employs St. Ambrose in the tertia pars of his Summa theologiae [ST]. Thomas's use of Ambrose has received little detailed [End Page 103] attention. One of Leo Elders's last contributions to the study of Aquinas and the Fathers provided an overview of Ambrose's presence in Thomas's writings.2 I hope to expand upon Elders's work of cataloging and describing Thomas's numerous citations of Ambrose—Thomas names Ambrose over eleven hundred times in his writings3—by making a particular argument about Thomas's Christological and sacramental use of Ambrose. While Elders gives an excellent summary of where Ambrose appears in Thomas's corpus, he does not connect Thomas's use of Ambrose in his treatises on Christ and the Eucharist. I argue that Thomas's citations of Ambrose in the tertia pars help him develop an understanding of the Incarnation that supports his sacramental realism, especially emphasizing contact with Christ in the Eucharist.4Much recent reflection on the Eucharist has sought to deemphasize the substantial presence of Christ and emphasize his presence in other ways. Michael C. McGuckian, for example, argues that the Western emphasis on Christ's presence in the Blessed Sacrament has damaged the understanding of participation in the heavenly liturgy and obscured other ways in which Christ is present, such as in the bishop presiding and the proclamation of the word. He claims that "those other presences surpass the presence in the elements in their personal quality, their dynamic force and their effect on our [End Page 104] spirits and are not to be undervalued."5 Looking at Thomas and Ambrose, we will see that Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist is preeminently personal, dynamic, and efficacious for our spirits. Colman O'Neill's masterful work of sacramental realism, Meeting Christ in the Sacraments, provides an entrée into such a study. The title derives from Ambrose. In his work A Defense of the Prophet David to Theodosius Augustus, Ambrose reflects on Psalm 51. Suddenly, in the middle of confessing his sins, David foresees the cleansing sacrament of baptism. In prophetic wonder, he cries out, "face-to-face you have shown yourself to me, Christ; I have discovered you in your sacraments."6 Even prior to their institution, David prophetically glimpses what the sacraments of the Old Law prefigure. In this vision, David sees "no longer in shadow, nor in figure, nor in type," but meets Christ in his sacraments.7 For Ambrose, the sacraments are real encounters with Christ. As O'Neill puts it, "Christ, who was worshipped from afar, comes near and touches the believer; and at his touch power goes out from him."8 For [End Page 105] Thomas, too, one meets Christ in the sacraments.9 While all the sacraments apply the merits of his Passion,10 the Eucharist is the locus par excellence for meeting Christ, since the whole Christ is there contained.11 The encounter is both personal and powerful.While the language of meeting or encountering Christ in the sacraments may seem to echo modern phenomenological philosophy, Thomas grounds the encounter in a realism of the Incarnation.12 His treatment of the encounter with Christ in the sacraments flows from his treatment of the Incarnation.13 Guy-Thomas Bedouelle summed up O'Neill's approach, which reflects Thomas's, as simply stressing, again and again, "that sacramental realism implies that the Church draws its life from the dynamism of the Incarnation itself."14 I argue that Thomas, in drawing his sacramental realism from the Incarnation, employs Ambrose as a key authority. First, I examine Thomas's knowledge and use of Ambrose's works. Second, I... (shrink)

Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies, Third Edition, provides a unique and interdisciplinary sampling of key articles and literary selections focusing on the diverse facets of peace and conflict studies. Featuring both classic and contemporary work, it enables students to read highly influential articles while also introducing them to the most current perspectives in the field. Timeless classics from Leo Tolstoy, Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and Henry David Thoreau are included alongside contemporary pieces. Updated to address current (...) concerns, the third edition incorporates fourteen new readings. Ideal on its own as a foundation text in any introductory peace studies course, Approaches to Peace, Third Edition, is also compact enough to use as a supplement with more specialized readings. Each selection is prefaced by a short introduction highlighting the author's background, the work's historical context, and the selection's significance in terms of the "big picture." Study questions and a list of suggested readings at the end of each selection also provide useful resources for students. (shrink)

In this article we focus upon the embodiment of vulnerability as an area in which medicine, society and the humanities can be profitably conjoined. We illustrate our argument with two interrelated case studies of narratives of the embodiment of ageing and longevity. First, we draw upon Leoš Janáček’s opera The Makropulos Case (1926) as a locus for debates about human longevity. Second, we discuss 70-year-old Janáček’s decade of unrequited love for a woman 37 years younger than himself, through an examination (...) of their intimate letters. We suggest that both the opera and elements of Janáček’s biography illuminate the passionate emotions that are often hidden behind ‘the mask of ageing’. Finally, we propose that a focus on the embodiment of vulnerability is a productive catalyst for research on narratives of ageing. (shrink)